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Abstract. Th is paper looks at the usage of depictions of monsters as a form of self-
representation on the Internet and attempts to discover what may hide behind this choice 
of the avatar. It endeavours to tie the notions of representation, visuality and monstrosity 
together, with the avatar at the intersection of images and identities. Th e purpose of 
this exploration is to open up a discussion to analyse and elucidate the phenomenon of 
monstrosity from a semiotic perspective, namely as a form of representation of the human 
being in the virtual world. Th e choice of an icon of a monster as avatar establishes a link 
between image and identity since a certain mind has put it forward as its representative 
in an eff ort to prove its own presence to the others with the intention of being seen in a 
particular way. Communicating this sign over the Internet is akin to the mediaeval carnival 
where the sign shield stands for the masquerade disguise, allowing one to overcome 
dogmatism and alienation engendered by the hierarchy of the society through making 
it possible to contact people of every rank, title or position, allowing one to become 
free.  
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I hurry up my day.
A sweet anticipation of the evening
When vexed with every tiniest delay
I pull the blinds up and opening the window
Into the world I let the darkness fl ood
My heart, my empty heart
And welcome all the monsters of the universe inside
And start
Th e ball, the show, the feast
And feel the growing wings behind my back;
Th ey fl ap like canvas in the wind. A beast
Myself, I know I’ve always lacked 
Two leathern wings 
To soar above the world
To dance with dragons,
Or to chase a unicorn,
To feel the blood of pagans, 
My predecessors, boiling in my veins,
To bear no bonds, to wear no chains…
Th en morning strikes and all remains
As it was:
I’m motionless and haunted by remorse…
If one looks at avatars (small pictures or icons that represent a computer user in an 
online social network or a game), one may come to the conclusion that most of them 
bear little or no resemblance to the subject1 who uploaded the image. Apart from 
photographs (captured by cameras or web cameras and oft en enhanced with the help of 
picture editing tools) one may encounter abstractions, pictures of children, group photos, 
landscapes, hieroglyphs, fl uff y kittens, etc. Th e use of images of beasts or monsters as 
a form of self-representation on the net is not such a rarity either. Personal experience 
of the author’s online activity, recapped by the poem, as well as her previous study in 
the fi eld of visual semiotics (Vavilova 2014), prompted the research question: can the 
digital monster fully represent its human carrier online, whatever the reasons for its 
choice are?  
In the search for an answer, this paper will look at the usage of depictions of monsters 
in representing humans on the Internet in an attempt to discover what may hide behind 
this choice of representamen – a term borrowed from Peirce (CP 2.227–2.308) as a 
synonym for sign. It will also seek to tie the notions of representation, visuality and 
monstrosity together, with the avatar at the intersection of images and identities. Th us it 
1 ‘Subject’ here means both individuals and collective entities, so-called virtual communities 
e.g. groups, clubs, people united online by a common feature; the ‘virtual world’ means the 
Internet. 
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will aim to explore the Internet as an arena for personal self-representation, and online 
identity in particular, in order to discover possible reasons for or factors involved in the 
choice of a non-human (monstrous) visual image, avatar, to represent its carrier in an 
online setting (a game, a forum, a chat, etc.). Th e point made here is that as far as the 
avatar-mediated visibility is concerned, seeing a picture of a monster involves seeing 
a person or other subject behind it, since a certain mind (individual, or collective) put 
it forward as its representative in an eff ort to prove its own presence to the other,2 an 
eff ort to be respected and acknowledged as the subject’s will. 
Our search will begin by examining the phenomenon of computer-mediated 
communication, with the focus on identity and its disclosure online; the next section will 
be devoted to avatars and monsters, and the way they can be related to each other. Further 
analysis will provide a semiotic insight into the notion of avatar-mediated visibility, its 
semantics, syntax, and pragmatics, leading to the discovery of possible reasons behind 
the choice of an avatar by a participant of computer-mediated communication.                
Computer-mediated communication: 
The background for online identity
Th e tendency of computerization in modern society, where the achievements of previous 
civilizations are transferred into the virtual environment, makes it a matter of utmost 
necessity to reconsider the role played by the Internet in modern social reality. As far 
as communication is concerned, this reconsideration is basically aimed at optimizing 
and eliminating the “side-eff ects” of computer-mediated communication some of which 
will be touched upon below. 
      Computer-mediated communication can be defi ned as a kind of interpersonal 
communicative interaction which is realized due to the multimedia potential of the 
Internet, including the circulation of verbal, video and audio messages.  Th e Internet 
here can be viewed as a space for constructing social connections that facilitate the 
inclusion of an individual into the matrix of his or her relations with others, and an 
environment where these connections are sustained in a specifi c communicative fi eld 
that penetrates all social structures and at the same time mediates interpersonal contacts. 
Th is mediation means that a participant in computer-mediated communication forms 
2 Here the term is used in line with Bakhtin’s usage, the other as a participant of the dialogue, 
or someone who leads one of the tunes in a polyphonic text (as opposed to the other as an 
embodiment of the concept of radical alterity, as an enemy, at its extreme): “Čužoj is the 
opposite of svoj [one’s own] and implies otherness – of place, point of view, possession or 
person. It d oes not (as does “alien” in English) imply any necessary estrangement or exoticism; 
it is simply that which someone has made his own, seen (or heard) from the point of view of an 
outsider […] Being čužoj makes dialogue possible” (Bakhtin 1981: 423). 
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his or her impressions of the other not by viewing, listening to or touching the other 
(though some of those processes can take place due to the use of such devices as web 
cameras), but mainly by coming across intangible products of the other’s life: e-mails, 
pictures, voice messages, music, etc. 
      Th e use of signs, however, is characteristic of every medium, even television, with 
its claims to be the mirror of reality, or reality itself; the sign is a medium, thus it is an 
element of every media system. Th e major feature that makes the Internet diff erent 
from other media is, in the author’s opinion, a greater extent of individual freedom, for 
instance the freedom of choice of information to be consumed,3 as well as the freedom 
of self-representation. Each individual in the digital community is enabled to unveil his 
or her true self fully, or indeed, to conceal it partially or wholly. Even though identity 
is conveyed through the exchange of signs, it still takes place in the space of free self-
expression, which will be discussed later in more detail. Th e use of special devices 
does not discredit the humane nature of online interaction and socialization. On the 
contrary, it helps one to overcome certain barriers of communication, for instance, 
being perceived as a carrier of a set of genes, as someone who belongs to a certain race, 
ethnos, sex, as a person of a certain age, social and marital status, etc. which are, inter 
alia, the factors that traditionally constitute one’s identity. 
     Th eir online manifestations (indication of race, sex, age, etc. in an online setting) 
certainly contribute to building and interpreting online (Internet, virtual, digital) 
identities, but to what extent? Much has been written on the issue of online identity 
regarding its relation to one’s identity in reality (see, for instance, references in Adams 
20054); opinions on the formation and communication of online identity range from 
a perception that it is a total contradiction of reality to the optimistic viewpoint that it 
is a genuine organic projection of its offl  ine counterpart. 
     To sustain this discussion, let us defi ne the notion. Internet identity is understood 
as “the social identity that people develop online, and that exists in the form of the 
reputation that they acquire (in forum, blogs, etc.), or the network of relationships 
that they build” (Nabeth 2006:  74). From another angle, it is an actively constructed 
3 One of the signs of this so-to-say informational liberation is that online moderation has 
become a substitute for traditional media gate-keeping with its total control over the topics 
to be covered and the picture to be shown to substantiate the verbal contents. A moderator is 
oft en a common user whose task is not to strangle alternative viewpoints, but rather to fi lter 
the contents from commercials or obscenities. Th us information recipients can access multiple 
angles via a variety of stories present on the Internet.  
4 Suellen Adams 2005. Information behavior and the formation and maintenance of peer 
cultures in Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games: A case study of City of Heroes. 
Retrieved from http://www.digra.org/digital-library/publications/information-behavior-and-
the-formation-and-maintenance-of-peer-cultures-in-massive-multiplayer-online-role-
playing-games-a-case-study-of-city-of-heroes/.
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self-presentation on the net that allows for a certain varying of personal information. 
It has been recently discovered that more and more users prefer indicating real data in 
their personal profi les (names, dates, marital status), which speaks for the tendency to 
disclose one’s true “contents”, rather than hide behind a mask of an imagined personality 
(Asmolov, Asmolov 2009). Today’s opponents of the classic works on so-called “identity 
play”, or juggling with multiple identities (e.g. Myers 1987; Turkle 1995) stand on the 
grounds that the modern Internet user’s virtual life is led in harmony with his or her 
reality, and thus give no food for more futile refl ections on the mosaic, fragmented 
character of digital identity. For instance, drawing on a research of online communication 
practices of ethnic minority women, Kennedy 2006 refutes the idea that online identity 
is always anonymous and distorted: personal characteristics that are inherent in a 
person in reality fi nd their continuation online, and people mostly prefer to tell the 
truth about themselves, rather than narrate a fi ctional story. 
      Having drawn this conclusion, one might be puzzled by the dilemma: given the latest 
facts on computer-mediated communication and the tendency of online and offl  ine 
identities to converge, why would Internet users persist in choosing anything but their 
own photographic depiction for an avatar, let alone something monstrous? To be able 
to answer that question, one should look more closely at avatars and monsters, to fi nd 
the thread that ties them to humans. 
Monsters and avatars
Th e Encyclopædia Britannica 2013 presents monsters as “chaos beasts, lurking at the 
interstices of order, be they conceived as mythical creatures who preceded creation, 
survivals from an archaic era, creatures who dwell in dangerous lands remote from 
human habitation, or beings who appear in nightmares”. Th is modern understanding of 
the term has moved away from its original, neutral, meaning and etymology, as is shown 
further in this paper, and implies the idea of something huge, hideous, threatening or 
inherently malignant, and alien to the natural design of the world. Th is understanding 
is akin to Plato’s view on the beast, a scapegoat to blame for one’s faults, opposed to all 
reason, as analysed by Mary Midgley in her Beast and Man: 
Black horses, wolves, lions, hawks, asses, and pigs recur every time he mentions 
the subject of evil […] His serious view is that evil is something alien to the soul; 
something Other, the debasing eff ect of matter seeping in through the instinctive 
nature. Th is treacherous element clearly cannot be anything properly human; 
it must be described in animal terms – and those of no particular animal at 
that, since all particular animals have their redeeming features, but a dreadful 
composite monster combining all the vices […]. (Midgley 2004: 30)
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Today the same meaning is ascribed to the monstrous. Even considering that the modern 
understanding of monstrosity has shift ed from the original one, the present-day fauna of 
monsters is surprisingly extensive, ranging from traditional vampires, ghosts, werewolves, 
mermaids, dragons, and demons depicted by John Greer 2001, the author of a guide 
to the world of magical creatures, to less commonplace characters from Rory Storm’s 
book on cryptozoology (Storm 2008), like the ogopogo, the sucuriju, the ucu, the 
tatzelwurm, the bunyip, the yowie, or the orang-pendek. Apart from fairy tales and 
bestiaries, the major residence of these legendary creatures today is the Internet where 
they can move easily across geographical, religious, political, economic, and cultural 
borders. It is hard to estimate correctly their presence in the virtual environment, but 
their habitat is huge: being used as avatars, their pictures are an inherent part of every 
online social networking service, not to mention specialized forums and online games 
(like Myth Wars, Dragon Days Legends, Days of Monsters etc.), where the monstrous 
is the cornerstone of communication. Th us the discussion leads us close to the concept 
of the avatar, familiar to every user of the Internet, but not fully discovered yet, as a 
social phenomenon, on the one hand, and an art object, on the other.
     Turning to diff erent defi nitions of avatar apart from the one mentioned above, the 
fi rst or primary meaning relates to the incarnation (human or animal) of a Hindu deity 
on earth. Derived from Sanskrit avatāra (‘descent’),  it “literally means descent of a deity 
from his abode in suitable form for certain purpose” (Varadpande 2009: 39). So the 
term primarily stands for one of the epitomes of a god on a quest. Th is quest usually 
involves counteracting a particular evil in the world, for instance, fi ghting a tyrannical 
demon. Although any god, being formless, may have these appearances, more oft en 
the term is used to refer to ten basic incarnations of Vishnu: a fi sh, a tortoise, a boar, a 
dwarf, a lion-man, Parashurama, Rama, Krishna, Buddha, and Kalkin. 
     Another meaning of the word touches upon an embodiment of an idea, quality, or 
philosophy in a person, or some other incarnation in a human form. In modern life 
people embody concepts, whereas in mythology they personify gods who descend into 
this world; as well as in Hindu legends, examples might be found in myths of diff erent 
peoples. Becoming an incarnation of the transcendental, embodying an idea, literally 
means providing one’s body (Latin carnis – fl esh) as a vessel for some formless substance. 
     Interestingly, Midgley 2004 mentions that in Ancient Greece people ascribed their 
intellectual blindness to being captured and moved by a god’s will. Later on, they began to 
fault their beastly nature, at the moments when they could have been said to be turning 
into avatars (incarnations) of the Beast. Today the roles have changed: it is the human 
whose will stands behind the monstrous avatar, for today, incarnation is not the fi nal 
stage of existence of ideas: human beings have found a way to mirror them back to the 
ideal world. Human demiurges have created a world of their own – the virtual world, 
a space where no physical entity can fi t, but needs to be represented. People “descend” 
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there, oft en in the shape of monsters, to commit their deeds, to fi ght their own demons, 
in the form of signs, which became possible due to the mediational character of the 
Internet. Th e avatar is not just a picture; it is a sign, which will be specifi ed further. 
Avatars as signs
To gain a better understanding of the pragmatics of choice of representamen, and the 
relation between offl  ine identity and its online counterpart manifested through avatars 
it is important to analyse the concept of the avatar from a semiotic perspective. Th e 
most fundamental division of signs involves distinguishing between icons, indices 
and symbols (CP 2.275). Th e fi rst type implies certain resemblance to the object, the 
second – certain adjacency to it. Th us an icon resembles the object it represents, and 
can exist independently from it, whereas an index is organically tied to an object and 
would vanish without it. However, it does not necessarily need an interpretant, a certain 
forestructure in the receiving mind, and can be fi xed a posteriori. 
     A symbol, on the other hand, is a conventional sign dependent on laws, habits or 
traditions of interpretation. For a symbol, this forestructure is essential: the link between 
the object and the sign must already be present in the mind of the other5, especially 
if this connection is associative, indirect, as, for example, in the case of the unicorn 
seen a symbol of chastity6. By pulling one corner of this triangle, the rest emerges; by 
mentioning the sign one appeals to its counterpart in the other’s mind. Both are related 
to a certain concept that stands behind a single object. In the famous discussion of the 
unicorn between William and Adso in Umberto Eco’s Th e Name of the Rose, we learn 
that symbolically, the concept is not merely the platonic eidos of all unicorns, but is 
5 In semiotics the other is indispensable as the bearer of the interpretant, an integral element 
of the basic semiotic relationship: “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a 
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Th ird, 
called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself 
to the same Object. Th e triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together 
by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations” (CP: 2.274). 
 As this triadic relationship cannot be reduced to any dyad, the fi gure of the other is essential. 
Th e sign does not only represent something (or someone, in the framework of this research), it 
necessarily does it to someone. Of course there might be extreme cases when the interpretant 
is formed in the consciousness of the subject who gave birth to the sign. It can be a mark drawn 
on a palm, or a thread wound around one’s fi nger – serving as a reminder, a sign for oneself to 
do something. 
6 Even if unicorns existed, chastity would contradict the natural order of things where 
mammals (to whom unicorns presumably belong) sexually reproduce; thus there can be no 
direct link between the creature (the representamen) and the concept behind it. Th is paradox 
might be a reason why unicorns no longer exist (and chastity is as rare a quality as its symbol). 
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inseparable from the idea of chastity, virtue, morality (Eco 1995: 316). If anyone picks 
this image as an avatar, it may be inferred that the person wishes to be associated with 
these qualities and uses this representamen to symbolize a part of his or her inner 
world. It must be admitted though, that a less sophisticated approach may prompt the 
thought that the user is merely tempted by the beauty of the image or is demonstrating 
his or her aff ection for the animal, in a totemistic way.  
     Does this simply mean, then, that an avatar is a symbol of the subject who picked it, 
on the premise that it stands for the person representing him or her on the net? Hardly. 
Th ere is no uncertainty that an angel may be seen as a symbol (of purity, spirituality, 
hope, good intentions – depending on the context). But how would we class an avatar 
depicting an angel in case it has been selected simply in order to represent someone 
whose name is Angela? It cannot be regarded as a symbol as there is no tradition 
anchoring this representamen to this person or even this class of people (all women 
called Angela). Th e choice has been made single-handedly – or in some rare cases 
collectively if it stands for a virtual community, but then it lacks convention involving 
other communities or individual users. 
     It is unlikely that the avatar belongs to the class of indices either, since even in 
the person’s absence on the net the sign remains;7 once uploaded there, it can lead a 
relatively independent existence, even if the user never opens the account again – this 
can be checked by reading the comments that some avatars provoke. Moreover, even 
if nobody ever opens this page to encounter this sign, it does not cease to exist on the 
net. Its presence may be regarded as indexical for it indicates the fact that the user was 
there, or that he or she got registered, but it is not its essential feature.8 
     Th erefore, it can be argued that the connection between the subject and the avatar is 
to a great extent based on resemblance – external or internal. In discussing diagrams (a 
subdivision of the icon), Th omas Sebeok (2001: 107) stresses Peirce’s thought that they 
do resemble objects, but not necessarily in looks, and the same might be said about the 
7 Jacques Derrida (1982: 9) states that classically “[t]he sign represents the present in its 
absence. It takes the place of the present [...] Th e sign, in this sense, is deferred presence”. Th ough 
he puts forward his critique of this classic approach, it would be diffi  cult to refute the statement 
that a web-image is doomed to substitute the subject, in temporal perspective, but even more so 
in terms of space. For the subject may be present in the web, but unless the web camera is on, the 
avatar has to represent him or her in a dimension where no human can be physically present.
8 Messaris (1997: 130–135) considers photography a case of Peircean indexicality as it is a 
physical trace of its referent, provided by photographic evidence. It is inferred that a picture 
can be naturally perceived as a truthful record of reality, whereas in fact it is just a case of 
visual deception achieved by the mechanisms of staging, editing, selection and computer 
manipulation – so a “truthful, human-like monster” as a substitute for the human. One can 
agree that it might be so when one talks about photography itself, and the image would be 
indexical, but it is not the case if it is used as an avatar. Th e procedure of being chosen on the 
user’s volition changes its semiotic status. 
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avatar. Th us it can be called an iconic sign linked with its bearer directly (as in the case 
of photography, on the basis of external resemblance) or mediated by means of an idea 
(as in the case of a voluntarily made choice, for instance in order to be associated with 
angelic patience). At the same time this sign is linked with the interpretant – an image 
in the other’s mind; in juxtaposing this image with the representamen, cognition or 
recognition of the subject by the other takes place. It is in the hope of forming a certain 
image that a picture is chosen as a representamen. So an avatar can be considered an 
iconic sign in as much as it resembles the object and has a meaning ascribed to it both 
by the message sender and the recipient. It is neither a symbol, which would require an 
agreed convention as to its meaning, nor an index because although the avatar serves 
to tell us that someone was there, it can also have an independent existence. 
     Having established that the avatar is primarily an iconic sign, let us continue with 
our analysis with regard to the semantics, syntax and pragmatics that traditionally 
constitute the study of sign systems, for if we develop Th omas Sebeok’s (2001: 108) 
thought, contemplation of the icon may sooner or later bring us closer to solving such 
philosophical problems as the issue of identity and its relation to the other.9
Semantics of avatars
As far as semantics, or the study of meaning, is concerned, the virtual world of the 
Internet is a unique reconstruction of reality, for its signs seem to represent all kinds 
of things in the world, including people and their properties, such as emotions. Apart 
from verbal contents, visuals play an important part in this representation. Th e semantic 
potential of the visual language (or rather, languages, since there are distinct variations, 
for instance, in the language of road signs or fi nger language) makes it an effi  cient 
communication tool due to its ability to convey meaning in spheres where verbal signs 
might be ineff ectual, for instance in the multilingual environment of online forums 
where not all participants in the conversation share the same language (English, Spanish, 
etc.). Meaning here is conveyed in the process of integrating percepts (impressions of 
objects received through the sensory systems) with concepts that already exist in the 
mind. Th ese are the abovementioned forestructures or presuppositions that form the 
referential context of comprehension to help one to understand the message. It is the 
same process as juxtaposing the representamen with the interpretant. In order to be 
able to sustain communication mediated by these images, taking into consideration 
9 Th e fourth branch mentioned by some authors is that of sygmatics “which concerns the 
true sign-object relationship” (Taysina 2013: 139); as regards our problem it helps us to fi nd out 
whether a sign corresponds to the person it stands for in the web (who starts to play the role of 
the object in relation to this sign, merely in terms of semiotics). 
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the concepts that stand behind these signs, dialogue participants should ideally share 
a “repertoire”, a set of codes which embody common concepts that stand behind these 
signs. But this is not always the case as far as visual language is concerned, due to its 
highly polysemantic nature which leaves it open to multiple interpretations. While a 
dictionary may prove useful when it comes to words, little or virtually no reference 
material can help one to “read” a painting and to get exactly the same concept that its 
author had in mind while painting. Th e same holds true for showcasing and interpreting 
avatars. Such a dialogue would need an agreed set of conventions in order to convey 
meaning despite any individual and cultural diff erences that may stand in the way of 
this – conventions which avatar-mediated communication defi nitely lacks. 
     To illustrate these discrepancies, let us consider the serpent, representations of which 
have a long history and a wide range of cultural associations. It was believed to have a 
healing or protective nature in ancient Mesopotamia and India. We still see entwined 
snakes on the caduceus as the symbol of medicine. Being the staff  of Hermes, this 
image dates back to Greek mythology where the snake was associated with wisdom and 
foresight. Th e Pythia, the Oracle of Delphi, was connected with the Python – a chthonic 
creature, opposed to the heavenly gods – hence its ambivalence which is echoed in the 
biblical tradition that highlights its malevolent features. Given the almost universal 
fear of snakes, this is understandable; and yet it is striking that in many cultures the 
serpent is seen as benefi cent, a protector and a healer, bound up, it seems, with the very 
foundation of the world and the dispenser of life, death and wisdom.
     Other images which are used as iconic representations on the net, seem less equivocal. 
Th e phoenix and the ubume symbolize birth and rebirth, dragons stand for power and 
rage, sirens – for beauty and temptation… Some creatures, such as the centaur, epitomize 
internal confl icts, the unity and struggle of diff erent elements; according to Greek legends, 
the centaur used to be a violent creature, because, in it, the human was mixed with the 
equine10. Others stand for the chaos of nature, like the grotesque Egyptian creature Amamet. 
For people who want to be associated with these concepts a picture of a monster bears 
a special semantic load, for it represents their identities, feelings, aspirations, hides their 
drawbacks, and helps to cope with their psychological complexes. 
     Apart from bearing a certain meaning (oft en contextual), a monstrous image is a 
structural phenomenon; consequently, it may undergo a further analysis, from the 
viewpoint of its morphology and syntax.  
10 In his analysis of the identity of Samsa in Kafk a’s Th e Metamorphosis Swinford (2012: 
233) examines another dialectic – that of individual identity and social uniformity, a confl ict 
between longing for harmony and reality; he draws parallels between Samsa’s image and 
those creatures of the microcosmos showcased photographically in Book of Monsters by the 
American naturalist David Fairchild.
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Morphology and syntax of the monstrous
In this study, morphology is concerned with identifi cation of basic units in the image 
of the monster (that can be read or interpreted as a visual text). From this angle, every 
monster is just a synthesis of certain anatomical parts that are obtained analytically, an 
assemblage which is nothing more than rearranged bits of reality – everything that the 
world of nature can off er to the eye. To illustrate this, a mermaid is a creature with a 
female human torso and a fi shtail. Substituting the wings and birds’ legs for the tail will 
give us a harpy. Th ose elements can be matched in all possible combinations, resulting 
in numerous creatures, both known to humankind and new. 
     Th e spatial arrangement of these anatomical parts is related to syntax (Horn 1998: 
8). Who would not know the children’s game in which a player draws an element of 
a monstrous body on a piece of paper, then folds this bit of the image and passes the 
drawing on, so that in the end the company gets a bird and a reptile, a man and a woman, 
a mammal and a marsupial – all in one? A syntactic analysis of such a creature may help 
better understand its semantics bringing one close to the idea that the concepts that stand 
behind those parts, or elements, might not, in fact, contribute to the image of the whole. 
If we take wings, for instance, the idea behind this image seems clear: it is freedom, the 
ability to rise above the commonplace. It is what may seem an improvement for the human 
body, from the fi rst sight. But, in combination with the feminine, wings will make a harpy, 
a creature referred to as one avid for blood and sexual pleasure (see, for example, Williams 
1999: 257). In this case freedom and the ability to fl y is given to the “evil” feminine spirit, 
and the positive connotations of wings turn the semantics of the whole image, namely 
the harpy, upside down. Perhaps the concept of monstrosity here is multiplied by that of 
femininity as examined by Simone de Beauvoir (1966), where woman herself is viewed as 
from the archetype of humankind, derived from man and therefore in a sense lesser than 
him – certainly the other in the dualistic thinking of ‘us-them’, ‘good-evil’, ‘men-gods’ 
type.11 It is actually the same binary opposition, the same relationship as might be traced 
between the god and the human, the human and the animal, or the monster.12
11 It would be interesting to compare this thought to another feminist idea. Laura Mulvey 
(1975) argues that a woman is an object of voyeuristic pleasure, as opposed to the male subject 
who beholds her; this is the order of things in the modern patriarchal society, and the fact that 
women are involved in watching movies can be interpreted in the way that an alien, masculine, 
pleasure is actually imposed upon them. Th ankfully, being open for people of every sex, age or 
race, avatar-mediated visibility has a potential for neutralizing such polarities.
12 Another interesting observation concerning binary oppositions and visuality was made 
by Lupton and Miller (2000: 157) in their writings on graphic design. In particular, in their 
analysis of Derrida’s ideas in relation to visuality and visual language, they unveil the opposition 
between high and low aesthetic forms. Th ey come to the thought that high and low take turns 
in diff erent contexts. What seems low in one setting may appear high in another.
the other (l’Autre), diff erent from Bakhtin’s čužoj, in the sense of someone who is excluded 
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both interlocutors and researchers. Exactly what is such a unity of opposites intended 
to convey? Considering the abovementioned tendency for convergence of the two 
identities, the online and the offl  ine ones, the conclusion that one would be most likely 
to draw is that the person who chose such an avatar wants to be viewed as a monster. 
Th e possible reasons for that are discussed further. 
Pragmatics of being seen
Th e issue of motivation is what stands behind the pragmatic choice; as far as the 
pragmatics of using monstrous images on the net is concerned, one makes one’s choice 
with a view to accomplishing one’s goals in dialogue in the best possible way. Th e fi rst 
probable answer to the question “Why a monster?” may be simply related to the idea 
of catching the others’ attention.
Greer begins his defi nition of monsters with a reference to Latin monstrum, 
originally meaning “a revelation, something shown forth” (Greer 2001: 3), thus tying 
this phenomenon to the concept of unveiling the unknown through its being shown (cf. 
another derivative – demonstrated). According to Greer, in ancient times the appearance 
of monstrous beings was treated as a message from other worlds, or “the hidden realms 
of existence” (Greer 2001: 4) and needed interpretation by wise men, such as omen 
readers. A monster was a sign for people to translate, whether of the good or the bad. 
Th is interpretation was primarily based on the mere ability to see, to discern this sign 
against the background of the mundane. As Parret (1994: 335) puts it in his analysis 
of synesthesy, “the very presence of things in the world is defi ned on the basis of their 
visibility”; in his opinion, vision is able to mediate between the real and the ideal; to see 
with one’s eyes means to be “capable of seeing the essence of things” (Parret 1994: 335). 
In the abovementioned overview of Vishnu’s avatars the idea of the importance of 
imagery appears as salient: the icons of tribal gods were not rejected but assimilated in 
Vishnu’s cult with the reservation that these were substitutes for the original depiction of 
the deity, used at his volition (Varadpande 2009: 173). Th us their non-classic appearance 
(which could be regarded as monstrous) still contributed to the glory of the supreme 
god. Williams’s review of the monstrous is also abundant in such words as ‘behold’, 
‘show forth’, ‘appearance’, ‘invisible’, ‘image’ and others in this or that way connected 
with visuality (Williams 1999). Th ese numerous examples tie monstrosity to visuality: 
when the commonplace fails to grasp attention, the monstrous attracts like a puzzle 
that pleads to be solved. 
In the view of Anna Wierzbicka (1999: 114), “being seen by other people” may be 
connected with embarrassment and the feeling of concern about one’s image, when 
one does not want people to think about oneself in a certain key. Th e way we represent 
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ourselves using pictures speaks about the way we interpret our personalities and want 
to be seen by the other. But how can a deliberate distortion of one’s human traits be 
interpreted in this respect? Williams 1999 writes about the superiority of the deformed 
image over the natural one. In this light the monstrous can be seen as culture surpassing 
nature, a more sophisticated symbolic layer overlapping the obvious phenomena found 
in the natural world. Th is leads us to another motif behind the sign choice. 
Subjecting nature or returning to it
Williams argues that before the Middle Ages the existence of monsters was believed to be 
of magical character. According to Greer 2001, the Scientifi c Revolution brought about 
a shift  in the human perception of monstrous revelations. Science rejected the idea of 
monstrosity, namely of the existence of mythical creatures in the world, leaving no place 
for its justifi cation. Yet our yearning for mystery, for revealing the unknown, our belief 
in magic still push us to seek for the supernatural. Perhaps choosing a creature for an 
avatar is connected with a desire to enter the world of magic? Perhaps it is indicative 
of the human craving to subject nature to one’s own purpose, to hone it to the edge of 
perfection, or even to overcome it? 
Profoundly unsatisfied with nature, and the human body in particular, 
humanity is thus in constant search for perfection. Perhaps that was a motive 
for creating monsters in the virtual world. One does not necessarily have to 
be a master of the cinematographic art – it is enough to manipulate an image 
using photography editing tools to give shape and form, on the net, to our 
longing for monstrosity, and for the human to edge closer to the act of creation. Th rough 
be coming a monster a human acquires, symbolically, its superhuman powers, as extra 
limbs, an ability to fl y, or an extended range of sensory perception. 
At the same time, this act may manifest our returning to our roots, our desire 
to revert to nature. As was mentioned above, a monster is just a being with shuffl  ed 
body parts, an animal. According to Reynaga who looks at creatures in Kafk a’s 
stories as vehicles of shame, as witnesses to people’s estrangement from themselves 
and longings to regain their paradise lost, “animals are the extant representatives of 
man’s primitive state, their bestial vitality having once been shared by his ancestors” 
(Reynaga 2012: 76). It can be deduced that the dialectic of this motivation is engendered 
by our alienation from nature, even though, according to Mary Midgley (2004), we 
are much closer to animals than we want to admit. Uncertain whether we agree to 
accept it, dare to surpass the beast in ourselves, or strive to snuggle up in Mother 
Nature’s shade in search for help from the totem, we continue our experiments with the 
monstrous. 
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echoed in mediaeval festive practices as a survival of totemism, this period being an 
important landmark for establishing the human-monster relationship, its roots and 
modern interpretation, to which we now turn. 
Wearing a mask or shedding one
Mediaeval monstrosity is closely linked to the concept of anatomical fantasizing, 
somewhat akin to the child’s play with body parts mentioned above. In his analysis of 
Rabelaisian imagery Mikhail Bakhtin (1965: 374) derives these mediaeval grotesque 
concepts of the body from the legends of the so-called Indian miracles in anthologies 
like Merveilles du Monde or Le roman d’Alexandre that defi ned the motifs of fi ne arts 
in the Middle Ages. Along with real animals, like the panther or the elephant, these 
anthologies pay much attention to fantastic creatures such as dragons, gryphons, harpies, 
or lycorns, as well as monstrous humanly creatures. Some of them are mixtures of the 
human and the animal, like hyppopodes or cinocephales. Apart from those, there is 
a whole gallery of images of those bearing certain pathology (one-legged sciopodes, 
six-handed people, etc.). Th is grotesque fantasizing so popular in the Middle Ages 
and obvious in Gargantua and Pantagruel as well, was connected with peculiarities of 
mediaeval perception of the Earth which, according to Bakhtin, was close to the image 
of the human body. Diff erent trous (holes) of the body were symbolic representations 
of terrestrial relief, and the human bottom stood for hell in this perception. Hence 
mixing body parts, matching human bodies with animal heads, wings or tails let one 
trespass the borders of the ordinary, and this bizarre fantasizing about the body enabled 
a mediaeval person to approach the forbidden, the taboo. 
     Avatar-mediated visibility is one means to this fantasizing which is still open for us 
today; therefore the Internet can be viewed as a peculiar kind of Bakhtinian carnival 
(coincidentally, as a space for incarnations), though for the modern mind, in eff ect a 
“second world and a second life” beyond the offi  cial (Bakhtin 1965: 8). It is as picturesque 
and mosaic as the carnival; and just as the carnival exists on the verge of art and life, 
so the Internet embraces the real and the virtual. Th e mediating character of computer 
communication enables us to switch on the logic of the topsy-turvy, inherent to the 
mediaeval carnival, and modify our social and demographic characteristics in exactly 
the same way, with the help of the digital disguise, or avatar. 
     Analysing gaming as the apogee of modern carnivalization makes it evident that 
the connection between the user and the avatar is not random at all. Th e avatar is the 
iconic sign communicated to the other in a game (or in the process of other computer 
related practices), a part of the human, betraying his or her monstrosity, chosen because 
of a desire to catch the other’s eye, a longing for the lost primeval state, or another 
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motive. What is more important is that wearing this mask does not lead to juggling 
with identities in an attempt to cover the person’s true self13. On the contrary, it allows 
for one’s liberation from conventionalities and dogmatism, the same way as during a 
carnival the person underwent rebirth for truly humane relationships, managing to 
overcome the alienation engendered by the hierarchy of feudalism, by making contact 
with others irrespective of their position, rank or merits (Bakhtin 1965: 13). Th e same 
holds true for the online “carnival”. While the user is logged on, disguise helps him or 
her to forget about the factors of alienation of the real life.14 It helps one to fully uncover 
the true nature of the human, extending beyond artifi cial boundaries of social classes 
(age, gender, position, income, education, etc.). A digital disguise here is just a means 
to surpass them, or, at least, to step aside from them, for a while, so that the person is 
not perceived as, say, the ethnic minority woman in her forties she “really” is, but as 
the serpent, wise and dangerous, she feels herself to be and wants to be perceived as.
Conclusion
Th e conclusion that can be made here is that in choosing a representamen the subject 
sets himself or herself free from restrictions and norms imposed from the outside. 
At the same time, the avatar should not be seen as a folding screen for psychological 
complexes; on the contrary, it is a masquerade outfi t which when worn enables someone 
to release one’s inner potential and thus to feel equal with the other, evading all prejudice 
and stereotypes. 
13 In her study of Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, Suellen Adams ponders 
over this seeming antinomy: “[a]lthough I considered it simply as a role to be played, I became 
aware that to a great extent, whether I intended it or not, whatever “role” I chose was going 
to become my outward “identity” to others within the game environment” (Adams 2005: 5). 
Th is is a paradox indeed: on the one hand, the avatar is used to conceal the identity, but on 
the other, “[i]t is obvious that behind every avatar is a human […] Th e avatar and the human 
are inextricably linked, and it is possible that humans are exploring meanings by way of an 
assumed identity embodied by the avatar” (Adams 2005: 2). 
14 Of course, depending on the society that uses the Internet, it can be viewed both as an 
instrument of social inclusion, and as a factor of alienation of the individual from real life. Th is 
same lack of control (for instance, on the part of a government) may have a negative infl uence 
on the formation of personality of a teenager or someone whose psyche can barely distinguish 
between the virtual and the real worlds. Not only may one bring a part of one’s identity into the 
space of computer-mediated communication, but one may also spread virtuality outside the 
computer world. For instance, being accustomed to the option of “pushing the pause button” 
in playing a computer game, in order to continue the quest next time, or “resurrecting aft er 
dying”, “using second, third life”, one may lose the adequate perception of the time continuum 
in reality, up to the point of total devaluation of one’s life.
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makes sense. Any attempt to reveal oneself to the other leads, or at least contributes, to 
penetration to the essence, to the core. Th e mere intention to be seen by the other, even 
in the shape of a monster, will be a link between the image and the identity, between the 
subject and the other. Undoubtedly the  dialogue may be successful here only on the 
condition of the other’s full understanding of the fact that this image is not an accurate 
copy of the subject, but an embodiment of the subject’s intention to be associated with 
this creature.15 Bearing that in mind, seeing a digital monster will mean seeing a person 
(or other subject) behind it, since someone put it forward as their representative in 
an eff ort to prove their presence,  no matter whether it was a sincere communication 
eff ort, a hoax, or an escapade meant to provoke. Communicating with a monster in 
one’s day-to-day communicative practices may give rise to attempts to fi nd out what 
kind of soul is hiding behind this image, in all its uniqueness, in its longing for the 
transcendental or merely in its attempt to project itself onto the world and be seen. 
     Th e aim of this essay was to explore the phenomenon of choosing a monster as an 
avatar in computer-mediated communication, in order to discover possible factors of 
this choice and to fi nd an answer to a question whether this image can be trusted as 
one’s substitute in the virtual world. Hopefully, answering positively, it succeeded with 
this challenge, at least to some extent, as an initial exploration of monstrous avatars, 
and will open up a discussion to further analyse and elucidate the phenomenon of 
monstrosity as a form of representation of the human being in the virtual world.16 
15 Let us consider the point derived from Kant’s theorization that the logical world restricts 
our mind so that we are able only to comprehend occurrences according to their appearances: 
“although phenomena are properly the appearances of things, but not ideas, or express the 
inner and absolute quality of objects, their cognition is nevertheless of the truest. For in the fi rst 
place, being apprehended sensual concepts, they, being consequences, witness the presence of 
the object […] and hence give occasion for perfectly true cognition” (Kant 1894: 56). Visual 
images being phenomenal are just resemblances of things, but can be trusted like any other 
representation. Any intentional visual deception in representation is justifi ed  as long as one 
represents oneself  – on the premise that he or she is the closest one  to the truth of things about 
him- or herself and is the only one who is able to judge which of his qualities are the primary 
and which the secondary. 
16 I would like to thank the following people for their invaluable help in writing this paper: 
Vadim Rudnev in whose books Alice found the entrance to Wonderland; my teacher Emiliya 
Taysina for her inspiring lectures on semiotics; my friend John Broadbent for being the fi rst 
gracious critic of the manuscript.  
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Виртуальные мифические существа: 
репрезентация человека в Интернете
В статье рассматривается использование изображений мифических существ в качестве 
саморепрезентации в Интернете. Связывая воедино понятия репрезентации, визуальности, 
монструозности, образа и идентичности, автор пытается обнаружить мотив, побуждающий 
пользователей выбирать подобный аватар. Цель этого исследования – открыть дискуссию 
для дальнейшего анализа использования изображения мифических существ в виртуальной 
реальности с точки зрения семиотики. Выбор аватара устанавливает связь между образом 
и идентичностью, поскольку волей человеческого разума он выступает представителем 
того, кто пытается доказать свое присутствие другим, движимый интенцией раскрыться, 
стать видимым в том или ином свете. Компьютерно-опосредованная коммуникация 
с помощью этого знака сродни средневековому карнавалу: маскарадный наряд здесь 
заменяет знаковый щит, позволяющий пользователю преодолеть догматизм и отчуждение, 
порожденное иерархичностью общества, предоставляющий возможность контактировать 
с людьми всех чинов и сословий, возвращающий человеку свободу. 
Digikoletised: inimeste representeerimisest internetis
Artiklis vaadeldakse koletiste kujutisi kui eneseesitlusvõimalust internetis ning püütakse 
jõuda selgusele, mis võib peituda sellise avatarivaliku taga. Püütakse siduda representatsiooni, 
visuaalsuse ja koletislikkuse mõisteid, nii et avatar jääb kuvandite ja identiteede lõikumiskohta. 
Eesmärgiks on algatada diskussiooni analüüsimaks ja valgustamaks koletislikkuse fenomeni 
semiootilisest perspektiivist, nimelt inimese esitlemisvõimalusena virtuaalmaailmas. Koletise 
ikooni valimine avatariks loob seose kuvandi ja identiteedi vahel, sest teatud mõistuse tahe 
on pannud selle ennast esindama, püüdes tõestada teistele oma kohalviibimist kavatsusega 
saada nähtud mingil kindlal viisil. Selle märgi edasiandmine internetis on suguluses keskaegse 
karnevaliga, kus märgikilp kujutab maskeraadikostüümi, võimaldades saada üle ühiskondliku 
hierarhia põhjustatud dogmaatilisusest ja võõrandumisest, muutes võimalikuks  kontakti kõigist 
seisustest, igasuguste positsioonide ja tiitlitega inimestega, lubades vabanemist.
